@amazebird/schema-form
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Publisher has 9 approved packages; coordinated multi-package release after dormancy is consistent with org resuming maintenance. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped org package with 116 versions; missing description is a style issue, not a risk indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established package predating provenance attestation; absence is expected and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.7.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.6.19 | 4 / 0 |
v4.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.