@amplitude/analytics-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Paired with maintainer-added; consistent with org team change, not a takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Amplitude org rotation; SLSA provenance and no code changes confirm legitimate handoff. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Amplitude migrated to GitHub Actions publishing with SLSA attestation; this is expected for all future versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:zen-observable | AI (dependencies): zen-observable is a well-known, benign observable library; stable dependency for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; gitHead absence is a minor metadata gap, not a supply-chain risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Amplitude consistently publishes via CI with SLSA attestation; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Amplitude SDK core package; sparse README/no keywords is a style choice, not a spam indicator for this established org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/zen-observable | AI (phantom-deps): @types packages are often declared as runtime deps for type resolution; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 74)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.49.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.48.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.48.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.48.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.47.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.47.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.46.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.45.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.44.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.44.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.43.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.43.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.42.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.41.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.41.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.41.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.41.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.41.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.41.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.41.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.41.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.40.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.40.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.40.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 2.39.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.38.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.37.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.36.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.36.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.35.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.35.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.35.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.34.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.34.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.33.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.32.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.32.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.32.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.31.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.31.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.30.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.29.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.28.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.27.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.27.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.27.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.26.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.26.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.26.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.25.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 2.24.1 | 2 / 0 |
v2.49.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.48.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.48.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.48.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.30.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.28.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.27.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.27.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.27.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.26.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.26.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.26.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.24.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.