@amplitude/experiment-js-client
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; legitimate for @amplitude org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:unfetch | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled dependency; not directly imported in source but legitimately used via build pipeline. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:base64-js | AI (phantom-deps): Bundled dependency; not directly imported in source but legitimately used via build pipeline. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.21.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.21.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.20.4 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.20.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.20.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.20.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.20.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.19.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.17.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.16.1 | 5 / 2 | |
| 1.15.6 | 5 / 2 |
v1.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.19.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.17.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.16.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.15.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.