@amplitude/plugin-page-view-tracking-browser
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Migration from individual npm account to GitHub Actions CI/CD; SLSA provenance confirms legitimate org pipeline. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Amplitude org regularly rotates npm team members; consistent with internal team management. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Mass removal consistent with Amplitude org restructuring npm access, not a hostile takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @amplitude/analytics-core is a first-party Amplitude package; not a suspicious third-party dep. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Published via GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; gitHead absence is a CI config change, not a threat. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Monorepo with 249 versions; dormancy reflects per-package publish cadence, not account compromise. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 152)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.11.11 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.10 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.9 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.8 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.11.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.10.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.10.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.10.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.9.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.8.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.7.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.7.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.7.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.7.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.12 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.11 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.10 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.9 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.8 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.6.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.7 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.6 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.5 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.4 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.3 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 2.5.1 | 4 / 7 | |
| 2.5.0 | 4 / 7 | |
| 2.4.4 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.4.3 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.4.2 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.4.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.4.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.48 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.47 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.46 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.45 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.44 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.43 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.42 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.41 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.40 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.39 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.38 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.37 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.36 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.35 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.34 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.33 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.32 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.31 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.30 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.3.29 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.27 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.26 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.25 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.24 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.23 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.22 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.21 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.20 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.19 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.18 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.17 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.16 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.15 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.14 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.13 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.12 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.11 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.10 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.9 | 3 / 8 | |
| 2.3.8 | 3 / 8 |
v2.11.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.11.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.