@ant-design/cli
CLI tool for querying antd knowledge and analyzing antd usage in projects
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation from the official ant-design org; legitimate automation pattern. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is from bundled versioned antd component data files (JSON.gz), not injected code payloads. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): oxc-parser is a well-known Rust-based JS parser; appropriate for a CLI that analyzes antd usage in projects. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Legitimate @ant-design scoped package; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive with no semantic relationship. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.4.2 | 1 / 12 | |
| 6.4.1 | 1 / 12 | |
| 6.4.0 | 1 / 12 | |
| 6.3.7 | 1 / 10 | |
| 6.3.6 | 1 / 10 | |
| 6.3.5 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 6 |
v6.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.