@antdv-next/icons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped Vue icon package; Levenshtein match to 'cors' is a false positive with no semantic relationship. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.8 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.6 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.5 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.4 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.3 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 18 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 13 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 12 |
v1.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.