@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime
Anthropic Sandbox Runtime (ASRT) - A general-purpose tool for wrapping security boundaries around arbitrary processes
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): dylanc-anthropic is an Anthropic employee account (naming convention matches org pattern); SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD build integrity. Legitimate internal maintainer transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): All new maintainers (dylanc-anthropic, ollie-ant-2025, packy-anthropic, noahz-anthropic) follow Anthropic employee naming conventions; legitimate team expansion for an official Anthropic package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/lodash-es | AI (phantom-deps): @types/lodash-es is a type declaration package mistakenly listed as a runtime dep; no security impact. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): apply-seccomp binaries are the core functionality of this sandbox runtime package; seccomp is a Linux kernel security mechanism requiring native binaries. SLSA provenance attestation confirms supply chain integrity. | ai |
Versions (showing 36 of 36)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.54 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.0.53 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.0.52 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.0.51 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.0.50 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.0.49 | 4 / 16 | |
| 0.0.48 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.47 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.46 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.45 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.44 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.43 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.42 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.41 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.40 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.39 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.38 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.37 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.34 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.33 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.32 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.31 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.30 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.29 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.28 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.27 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.26 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.25 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.24 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.23 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.21 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.20 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.19 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.18 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.17 | 6 / 16 | |
| 0.0.16 | 6 / 16 |
v0.0.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.53
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.52
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.51
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.50
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.49
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/vendor/seccomp/arm64/apply-seccomp • dist/vendor/seccomp/x64/apply-seccomp • vendor/seccomp/arm64/apply-seccomp • vendor/seccomp/x64/apply-seccomp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.48
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.47
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.46
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.42
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.41
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.40
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.39
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.38
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.37
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.34
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.33
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.32
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.31
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.30
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.29
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.28
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.27
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.25
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.