@antseed/node
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Postinstall runs a local patch script for ethers dependency; consistent with documented SDK purpose. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): env-spread in native module rebuild helper passing arch flags; standard pattern, not exfiltration. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:zod | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @antseed/node has no resemblance to zod in purpose or name; levenshtein match is spurious. | ai |
v0.2.86
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.74
3 findingsScript: node scripts/patch-ethers.js
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 128 | cwd: nodePackageDir, 129 | stdio: 'inherit', > 130 | env: { 131 | ...process.env, 132 | npm_config_arch: process.arch,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.