@antsoo-lib/icons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped icon library; name similarity to 'cors' is coincidental, not a plausible impersonation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:remixicon | AI (phantom-deps): remixicon is a peer/CSS dependency referenced in config; not directly imported in JS is expected for icon font packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 0 |
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.