All @antv/g-plugin-rough-canvas-renderer versions
@antv/g-plugin-rough-canvas-renderer @2.3.1
Maintainers
Keywords
Dependencies (7)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| bun | ^1.3.13 | auto_approved |
| tslib | ^2.5.3 | auto_approved |
| roughjs | ^4.5.2 | auto_approved |
| @antv/util | ^3.3.5 | auto_approved |
| @antv/g-lite | 2.7.0 | auto_approved |
| @antv/g-canvas | 2.2.0 | auto_approved |
| @babel/runtime | ^7.25.6 | auto_approved |
Transitive Dependency Tree
Changes from v2.1.1
Dependency Changes
| Change | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| added | bun | ^1.3.13 |
Script Changes
+ preinstallFile Changes
Risk Dispositions (6 applicable to this version, 0 other)
Accepted rules are downgraded to INFO on future analyses; rejected rules escalate to CRITICAL.
| Rule | Source | Disposition | Author | Reason | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
install-script:preinstall |
install-scripts | reject | AI | AI (install-scripts): Preinstall runs obfuscated index.js — malicious payload execution on install. | |
obfuscated-file:index.js |
source-diff | reject | AI | AI (source-diff): Obfuscated 498KB file with crypto imports and env-spread is a malware payload. | |
url-dep:@antv/setup |
npm-metadata | reject | AI | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned GitHub optionalDep matches known supply-chain attack pattern; generalizes to this package. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-while-true |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): javascript-obfuscator signature in malicious payload file. | |
semgrep:env-spread |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): process.env spread in obfuscated code indicates credential harvesting. | |
publisher-changed |
provenance | reject | AI | AI (provenance): Publisher change to atool coincides with malicious payload injection. |
SAST Findings (10)
Script: bun run index.js
Dependency '@antv/setup' in `optionalDependencies` points to 'github:antvis/G2#1916faa365f2788b6e193514872d51a242876569' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
while(!![]) loop is a signature of javascript-obfuscator output > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
Review Summary
Risk score: 100 (capped from 367). Findings: 6 critical (+240), 3 high (+75), 4 medium (+40), 4 low (+12).
Published to npm: