All @antv/x6-plugin-snapline versions
@antv/x6-plugin-snapline @2.3.7
Maintainers
Keywords
Dependencies (1)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| bun | ^1.3.13 | auto_approved |
Dev Dependencies (1)
| Package | Constraint | Registry Status |
|---|---|---|
| @antv/x6 | ^2.x | auto_approved |
Transitive Dependency Tree
Changes from v2.1.7
Dependency Changes
| Change | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| added | bun | ^1.3.13 |
Script Changes
+ preinstallFile Changes
Risk Dispositions (6 applicable to this version, 0 other)
Accepted rules are downgraded to INFO on future analyses; rejected rules escalate to CRITICAL.
| Rule | Source | Disposition | Author | Reason | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
install-script:preinstall |
install-scripts | reject | AI | AI (install-scripts): Preinstall executes obfuscated malware payload; disqualifies all versions with this script. | |
obfuscated-file:index.js |
source-diff | reject | AI | AI (source-diff): Obfuscated index.js is the malware payload; generalizes as a disqualifier for this package. | |
url-dep:@antv/setup |
npm-metadata | reject | AI | AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned GitHub optionalDep used to smuggle payload; matches known attack pattern. | |
semgrep:obfuscation-while-true |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): Obfuscator signature in preinstall payload; stable disqualifier. | |
semgrep:env-spread |
semgrep | reject | AI | AI (semgrep): process.env spread in obfuscated preinstall payload indicates credential exfiltration. | |
publisher-changed |
provenance | reject | AI | AI (provenance): Publisher change to atool coincides with malicious payload injection; account takeover confirmed by context. |
SAST Findings (10)
Script: bun run index.js
Dependency '@antv/setup' in `optionalDependencies` points to 'github:antvis/G2#1916faa365f2788b6e193514872d51a242876569' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
while(!![]) loop is a signature of javascript-obfuscator output > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Hex-prefixed function names (_0x...) are generated by javascript-obfuscator > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets > 1 | const _0x192368=_0x2a3a;(function(_0x44be0e,_0x3ff020){const _0x46b694={_0x4a8b2d:0x5bf,_0x1acf94:0x3d9,_0x2ef3d3:0x527,
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
Review Summary
Risk score: 100 (capped from 371). Findings: 6 critical (+240), 3 high (+75), 5 medium (+50), 2 low (+6).
Published to npm: