@anywaydata/mcp
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:yup | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @anywaydata/mcp; Levenshtein match to 'yup' is coincidental, not a typosquat attempt. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.