@apiclient.xyz/cloudflare
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist_ts/cloudflare.classes.convenientdnsprovider.js | AI (source-diff): Readable TypeScript-compiled dist output; long-line heuristic false positive for this package's build artifacts. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist_ts/cloudflare.classes.recordmanager.js | AI (source-diff): Readable TypeScript-compiled dist output; long-line heuristic false positive for this package's build artifacts. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established publisher with clean track record; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.