@apollo/planner-preview
Internal package
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): Standard wasm-bindgen glue code pattern; new Function() is used to bridge WASM string args, not for arbitrary code execution. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal WASM binary package; no repo/deps/keywords is expected for this type of artifact. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.14.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.13.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.12.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.11.0 | 0 / 0 |
v2.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.13.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.12.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.