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@applitools/dom-capture

npm Homepage
18
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

danielputermangearmamit.rokachroy.selaapplitools-adminapplitools-readonlyiasisappnoam.mendelarik-applitoolsyotammademdenis.styrtkyrylo.onufriievormedaclementbarryidosapplitoolsgofilordalex.burdeynyyronikar_applitoolsbenny.halberstadtgrayscale64fatihsolhan-applitoolsitaiz134dockermasteranandbagmarsergovapplitoolsfluxomni.iommilappnoam.gaashroeefranastasia.koifmanaretm_borodavkayonittzairilevyasundaram-applitoolsamir.groismanemasuarynaama.shohamadamcarmimulygottliebyoavnaveh-applitoolschaimaharonsonmovshonetta.bondyshirbinranhadardmytro-hrostyslav.pidburachynskyi.applitoolstaltool

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
npm-metadata url-dep:cssom AI (npm-metadata): SHA-pinned devDependency only; not shipped to consumers. Stable pattern for this package's test tooling. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@applitools/dom-shared AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep; phantom-dep heuristic is unreliable for monorepo packages. ai

Versions (showing 18 of 18)

Version Deps Published
11.8.0 2 / 28
11.7.1 2 / 26
11.7.0 2 / 26
11.6.13 2 / 26
11.6.12 2 / 26
11.6.11 2 / 26
11.6.10 2 / 26
11.6.9 2 / 26
11.6.8 2 / 26
11.6.7 2 / 26
11.6.6 2 / 26
11.6.5 2 / 26
11.6.4 2 / 26
11.6.3 2 / 26
11.6.2 2 / 26
11.6.1 2 / 26
11.6.0 2 / 26
11.5.6 2 / 26

v11.8.0

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.7.1

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.7.0

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.13

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.12

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.11

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.10

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.9

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.8

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.7

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.6

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.5

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.4

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.3

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.2

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.1

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.6.0

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v11.5.6

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): cssom npm-metadata

Dependency 'cssom' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/amitzur/CSSOM.git#925260ff2c8f8387cf76df4d5776a06044a644c8' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.