@applitools/req
Applitools fetch-based request library
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): Bundled undici llhttp WASM binary; stable across versions of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with long history; provenance adoption is still rare. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE | AI (license): License file exists in repo; standard Applitools SDK pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@applitools/utils | AI (dependencies): Same-org Applitools dependency; consistent pattern across all package versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@applitools/logger | AI (dependencies): Same-org Applitools dependency; consistent pattern across all package versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@applitools/logger | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency; likely used transitively or conditionally — stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.10.2 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.10.1 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.10.0 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.9.3 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.9.2 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.9.1 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.9.0 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.8 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.7 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.6 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.5 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.4 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.3 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.2 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.1 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.8.0 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.7.15 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.7.14 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.7.13 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.7.12 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.7.11 | 5 / 7 |
v1.10.2
3 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (movsho) than the most recent previously approved version (danielputerman) on 2026-05-26, but movsho is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.10.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.9.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.9.0
2 findingsModified file contains 2 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.8.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.