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@argos-ci/api-client

npm Repository Homepage
38
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

neoziro

Keywords

apiopenapiargos

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance regressed-provenance AI (provenance): Manual publish by known maintainer neoziro; no code changes, no malicious behavior. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Package intentionally migrated to GitHub Actions publishing with SLSA attestation; not a compromise signal. ai

Versions (showing 38 of 38)

Version Deps Published
0.26.0 3 / 4
0.25.0 3 / 4
0.24.4 3 / 4
0.24.1 3 / 4
0.24.0 3 / 4
0.23.0 3 / 4
0.22.1 3 / 4
0.22.0 3 / 4
0.21.0 3 / 4
0.20.1 3 / 4
0.20.0 2 / 4
0.19.0 2 / 4
0.18.0 2 / 4
0.17.0 2 / 4
0.16.1 2 / 4
0.16.0 2 / 4
0.15.0 2 / 4
0.14.0 2 / 4
0.13.0 2 / 4
0.12.0 2 / 4
0.11.1 2 / 4
0.11.0 2 / 4
0.10.0 2 / 3
0.9.0 2 / 3
0.8.2 2 / 3
0.8.1 2 / 3
0.8.0 2 / 3
0.7.2 2 / 3
0.7.1 2 / 3
0.7.0 2 / 3
0.6.2 2 / 3
0.6.1 2 / 3
0.6.0 2 / 3
0.5.1 2 / 3
0.5.0 1 / 2
0.4.0 1 / 2
0.3.0 1 / 2
0.2.0 1 / 2

v0.26.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.25.0

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: neoziro → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-10) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v0.24.4

2 findings
HIGH Provenance attestation missing — previous versions had it provenance

This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.

INFO Publisher changed: GitHub Actions → neoziro (on 2026-07-09, known maintainer) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (neoziro) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-09, but neoziro is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.24.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.24.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.23.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.8.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.8.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.7.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.7.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.7.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.6.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.6.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.6.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.5.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.5.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.4.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.