@argos-ci/browser
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | regressed-provenance | AI (provenance): Manual publish by known maintainer neoziro (maintainer on all prior versions); payload clean, no material diff vs v6.4.1. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package transitioned to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; this is the expected publisher going forward. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.4.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 6.4.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 6.4.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 6.3.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 6.2.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 6.1.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 6.0.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 5.1.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 5.1.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 5.1.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 5.1.0 | 0 / 1 |
v6.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (neoziro) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-09, but neoziro is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v6.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.