@argos-ci/browser
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package transitioned to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; this is the expected publisher going forward. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.1.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 6.0.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 5.1.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 5.1.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 5.1.1 | 0 / 1 | |
| 5.1.0 | 0 / 1 |
v6.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.