@argos-ci/playwright
Playwright SDK for visual testing with Argos.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/test-KJB2UYNA.js | AI (source-diff): tsup/esbuild-bundled playwright-core; minified build output, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size growth from bundling playwright-core into dist; expected for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/test-KJB2UYNA.js | AI (source-diff): Net+exec patterns are from bundled playwright-core test tooling; benign build artifact. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Shift to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation is a provenance improvement, not a takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@argos-ci/util | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling dep from the same argos-ci monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@argos-ci/browser | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling dep from the same argos-ci monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established publisher with long history; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 55 of 55)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.4.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.3.7 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.3.6 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.3.5 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.3.4 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.3.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.3.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.2.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.1.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.1.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.1.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.1.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.9 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.8 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.7 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.6 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.5 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.4 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.6.4 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.6.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.6.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.6.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.6.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.5.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.4.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.4.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.4.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.3.10 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.3.8 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.3.7 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.3.6 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.3.5 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.3.4 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.3.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.3.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.2.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.1.10 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.5 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.1.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.0.4 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.0.3 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.0.2 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.0.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 6.0.0 | 5 / 3 |
v7.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.5
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (provenance): Publisher shift from GitHub Actions to human account on same version warrants explicit human sign-off.) This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.4
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (provenance): Provenance regression is a strong compromise indicator; should block until CI publish is restored.) This version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (neoziro) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-09, but neoziro is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v7.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.3
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.2
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.