@arizeai/phoenix-client
A client for the Phoenix API
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@arizeai/phoenix-otel | AI (dependencies): Same-org dependency from the Arize AI ecosystem; expected sibling package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@arizeai/phoenix-config | AI (dependencies): Same-org dependency from the Arize AI ecosystem; expected sibling package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@arizeai/openinference-vercel | AI (dependencies): Same-org dependency from the Arize AI ecosystem; expected sibling package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@arizeai/openinference-vercel | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org runtime dependency; declared in package.json dependencies, not a phantom dep concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 52)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.1.1 | 7 / 16 | |
| 7.1.0 | 7 / 16 | |
| 7.0.1 | 7 / 16 | |
| 7.0.0 | 7 / 16 | |
| 6.14.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 6.14.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 6.14.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 6.13.0 | 8 / 14 | |
| 6.12.2 | 8 / 14 | |
| 6.12.1 | 8 / 14 | |
| 6.12.0 | 8 / 14 | |
| 6.11.2 | 8 / 14 | |
| 6.11.1 | 8 / 14 | |
| 6.11.0 | 8 / 14 | |
| 6.10.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.10.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.9.3 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.9.2 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.9.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.9.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.8.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.8.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.7.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.6.2 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.6.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.6.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.5.5 | 8 / 12 | |
| 6.5.4 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.5.3 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.5.2 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.5.1 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.5.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.4.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.3.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.2.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.1.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 6.0.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 5.9.0 | 9 / 10 | |
| 5.8.2 | 9 / 11 | |
| 5.8.1 | 9 / 11 | |
| 5.8.0 | 9 / 11 | |
| 5.7.0 | 9 / 11 | |
| 5.6.1 | 9 / 11 | |
| 5.6.0 | 9 / 11 | |
| 5.5.5 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.5.4 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.5.1 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.5.0 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.4.1 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.4.0 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.3.0 | 8 / 11 |
v7.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.14.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.14.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.12.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.11.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.8.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.5.5
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mikeldking) on 2025-12-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.5.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mikeldking) on 2025-12-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.