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@asgardeo/express

Express.js implementation of Asgardeo JavaScript SDK.

51
Versions
Apache-2.0
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

wso2-org

Keywords

asgardeoexpress.jsserver

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
npm-metadata url-dep:@wso2/eslint-plugin AI (npm-metadata): devDependency only; not shipped to consumers. SHA-pinned to a known WSO2 contributor repo. ai
npm-metadata url-dep:@wso2/prettier-config AI (npm-metadata): devDependency only; not shipped to consumers. SHA-pinned to a known WSO2 contributor repo. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Established WSO2 org package; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk signal here. ai

Versions (showing 51 of 79)

View all versions
Version Deps Published
0.0.80 2 / 10
0.0.78 2 / 10
0.0.77 2 / 10
0.0.76 2 / 10
0.0.75 2 / 10
0.0.74 2 / 10
0.0.73 2 / 10
0.0.72 2 / 10
0.0.71 2 / 10
0.0.70 2 / 10
0.0.69 2 / 10
0.0.68 2 / 10
0.0.67 2 / 10
0.0.66 2 / 10
0.0.65 2 / 10
0.0.64 2 / 10
0.0.63 2 / 10
0.0.62 2 / 10
0.0.61 2 / 10
0.0.60 2 / 10
0.0.59 2 / 10
0.0.58 2 / 10
0.0.57 2 / 10
0.0.56 2 / 10
0.0.55 2 / 10
0.0.54 2 / 10
0.0.53 2 / 10
0.0.52 2 / 10
0.0.51 2 / 10
0.0.50 2 / 10
0.0.49 2 / 10
0.0.48 2 / 10
0.0.47 2 / 10
0.0.46 2 / 10
0.0.45 2 / 10
0.0.44 2 / 10
0.0.43 2 / 10
0.0.42 2 / 10
0.0.41 2 / 10
0.0.40 2 / 10
0.0.39 2 / 10
0.0.38 2 / 10
0.0.37 2 / 10
0.0.36 2 / 10
0.0.35 2 / 10
0.0.34 2 / 10
0.0.33 2 / 10
0.0.32 2 / 10
0.0.31 2 / 10
0.0.30 2 / 10
0.0.29 2 / 10

v0.0.80

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.78

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.77

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.76

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.74

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.73

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.72

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.71

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.70

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.69

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.68

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.67

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.66

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.65

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.64

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.63

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.62

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.61

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.60

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.59

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.58

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.57

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.56

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.55

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.54

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.53

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.52

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.51

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.50

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.49

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.48

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.47

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.46

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.45

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.44

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.43

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.42

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.41

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.40

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.39

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.38

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.37

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.36

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.35

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.34

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.33

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.32

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.31

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.30

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.29

3 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/eslint-plugin npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): @wso2/prettier-config npm-metadata

Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.