@asgardeo/react
React implementation of Asgardeo JavaScript SDK.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@wso2/eslint-plugin | AI (npm-metadata): devDependency only; internal WSO2 linting config, not included in published dist. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | url-dep:@wso2/prettier-config | AI (npm-metadata): devDependency only; internal WSO2 prettier config, not included in published dist. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:esbuild | AI (phantom-deps): esbuild is the build tool used in esbuild.config.mjs; declared as dep for bundler use, not directly imported in source. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a standard TypeScript runtime helper; declared as dep, implicitly used by compiled output. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-dom | AI (phantom-deps): react-dom is a legitimate runtime dep for a React SDK; referenced in config/build files. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/react-dom | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only dep for a React package; framework-scoped, loaded by convention. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 127)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.25.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.25.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.24.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.24.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.24.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.23.7 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.23.6 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.23.5 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.23.4 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.23.3 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.23.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.23.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.23.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.22.5 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.22.4 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.22.3 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.22.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.22.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.22.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.21.4 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.21.3 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.21.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.21.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.21.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.20.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.20.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.19.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.18.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.18.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.17.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.16.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.16.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.16.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.15.4 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.15.3 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.15.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.15.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.15.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.14.4 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.14.3 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.14.2 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.14.1 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.14.0 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.13.4 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.13.3 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.13.2 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.13.0 | 8 / 14 | |
| 0.12.0 | 8 / 14 | |
| 0.11.3 | 8 / 14 | |
| 0.11.2 | 8 / 14 | |
| 0.11.1 | 8 / 14 | |
| 0.11.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.10.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.9.3 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.9.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.9.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.9.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.8.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.7.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.31 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.30 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.29 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.28 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.27 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.26 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.25 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.24 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.23 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.22 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.21 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.20 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.19 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.18 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.17 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.16 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.15 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.14 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.13 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.12 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.11 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.10 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.9 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.8 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.7 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.6 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.5 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.4 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.3 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.6.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.33 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.32 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.31 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.30 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.29 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.28 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.27 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.26 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.5.25 | 7 / 15 |
v0.25.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.25.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.24.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.24.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.24.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.7
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.6
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.5
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.4
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.23.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.23.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.23.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.22.5
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.22.4
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.22.3
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.22.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.22.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.22.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.21.4
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.21.3
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.21.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.21.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.21.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.20.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.20.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.19.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.17.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.16.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.16.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.16.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.4
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.3
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.4
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.3
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.4
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.3
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#d3041825a4f8f235c8f9fa36b55cf29d54e791c8&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.12.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.3
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.11.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.10.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.3
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.2
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.1
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.9.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.8.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.0
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.31
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.30
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.29
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.28
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.27
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.26
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.25
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.24
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.23
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.22
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.21
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.20
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.19
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.17
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.16
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.15
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.14
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.13
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.12
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.11
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.10
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.9
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.8
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.7
3 findingsDependency '@wso2/eslint-plugin' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/eslint-plugin' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency '@wso2/prettier-config' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/brionmario/wso2-ui-configs.git#a1fc6eb570653c999828aea9f5027cba06af4391&path:packages/prettier-config' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.