@assaabloy/gw-group-dc
Web component - Download Center
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:downloadCenter.js | AI (source-diff): Standard webpack bundle output for a web component; pattern is consistent across versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v3.0.6
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.