@assetpipe/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI is expected for automated release pipelines; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate CI origin. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Package is a scoped asset-pipeline core module, not a CORS impersonation; name similarity is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.7.4 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.7.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.7.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.7.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.7.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.6.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.6.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.5.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.5.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.5.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.4.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.6 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.5 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.4 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 8 / 1 |
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
2 findingsPackage name '@assetpipe/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.