@assistant-ui/react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zustand | AI (phantom-deps): Re-exported via Radix UI dependencies; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@radix-ui/react-use-callback-ref | AI (phantom-deps): Direct dependency used in component exports; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@radix-ui/react-compose-refs | AI (phantom-deps): Direct dependency used in component exports; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@radix-ui/react-primitive | AI (phantom-deps): Direct dependency used in component exports; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-textarea-autosize | AI (phantom-deps): Direct dependency used in component exports; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@radix-ui/react-slot | AI (phantom-deps): Direct dependency used in component exports; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@radix-ui/primitive | AI (phantom-deps): Direct dependency used in component exports; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | regressed-provenance | AI (provenance): Manual publish by known maintainer yonom; publishConfig provenance:false is intentional for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): safe-content-frame is a first-party @assistant-ui-adjacent dep; benign additions expected across versions. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): JWT base64url decoding in auth code, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package has SLSA provenance via Sigstore; strongest supply chain integrity signal, stable for this package going forward. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): UI component library for AI chat; adding new source files is expected growth. No large files (≥50KB) flagged, no script or dep changes — consistent with normal feature development. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-dropdown-menu | AI (dependencies): @radix-ui/react-dropdown-menu is a well-known, widely-trusted Radix UI component; entirely appropriate for a React UI component library. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI/CD-published release with SLSA provenance is consistent with legitimate resumption of development, not account takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from yonom to GitHub Actions CI/CD, consistent with intentional migration to automated publishing with SLSA provenance attestation. Not a suspicious actor. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@standard-schema/spec | AI (phantom-deps): @standard-schema/spec is a legitimate schema spec package used at config/type level; not being directly imported in source is expected for this kind of dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@assistant-ui/store | AI (dependencies): First-party scoped package from the assistant-ui org; expected internal dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@assistant-ui/core | AI (dependencies): First-party scoped package from the assistant-ui org; expected internal dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@assistant-ui/tap | AI (dependencies): First-party scoped package from the assistant-ui org; expected internal dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:assistant-stream | AI (dependencies): First-party dependency from the assistant-ui ecosystem, same publisher and GitHub org. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:radix-ui | AI (dependencies): radix-ui is a well-known React UI primitives library; expected dependency for this UI component package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:assistant-cloud | AI (dependencies): First-party dependency from the assistant-ui ecosystem, same publisher and GitHub org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:nanoid | AI (phantom-deps): nanoid is a well-known ID generation library; phantom-dep finding is benign for a build/config reference. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod | AI (phantom-deps): zod is a well-known validation library; phantom-dep finding is benign for a build/config reference. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 427)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.14.28 | 19 / 11 | |
| 0.14.27 | 19 / 11 | |
| 0.14.26 | 19 / 11 | |
| 0.14.24 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.23 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.22 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.21 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.20 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.19 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.18 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.16 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.15 | 17 / 11 | |
| 0.14.14 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.13 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.12 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.11 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.9 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.8 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.7 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.6 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.5 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.4 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.3 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.2 | 17 / 10 | |
| 0.14.0 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.28 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.27 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.26 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.25 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.24 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.23 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.22 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.21 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.20 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.19 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.17 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.16 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.15 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.14 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.12 | 16 / 10 | |
| 0.12.11 | 18 / 10 | |
| 0.12.10 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.12.9 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.12.8 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.12.7 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.12.6 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.12.5 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.12.3 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.12.1 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.12.0 | 17 / 8 | |
| 0.11.58 | 16 / 8 |
v0.14.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.5
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (yonom) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-13, but yonom is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.14.4
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (yonom) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-13, but yonom is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.14.3
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (yonom) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-13, but yonom is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.14.2
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (yonom) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-13, but yonom is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.