@asyncapi/specs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from asyncapi-bot to GitHub Actions is a legitimate CI automation change, confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by project cadence; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate CI-driven publish from official repo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/json-schema | AI (phantom-deps): @types/json-schema is a TypeScript types package intentionally listed as a runtime dep to expose types to consumers; not imported at runtime by convention. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process is used only in scripts/add-new-version.js, a developer maintenance script not executed at install or runtime. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require() in scripts/add-new-version.js loads a resolved JSON file path within the project; not user-controlled and not part of published runtime code. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.11.1 | 1 / 9 | |
| 6.11.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 6.10.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 6.9.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 6.8.1 | 1 / 9 | |
| 6.8.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 6.7.1 | 1 / 7 |
v6.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.11.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (asyncapi-bot) on 2026-01-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v6.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.