@atlaskit/analytics-listeners
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian's atlassianartifactteam publishes all @atlaskit packages without Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across their entire catalog and not a risk signal for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.1.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 10.1.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 10.0.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 9.3.0 | 5 / 3 | |
| 9.2.0 | 5 / 3 |
v10.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.