@atlaskit/editor-plugin-interaction
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atlaskit/editor-prosemirror | AI (dependencies): @atlaskit/editor-prosemirror is a first-party Atlaskit package from the same publisher/ecosystem; not a suspicious third-party dependency. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian publishes their Atlaskit packages without Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across their entire package family and not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-peer-dep:@atlaskit/tokens | AI (dependencies): @atlaskit/tokens is a well-known first-party Atlaskit design token package; stable false positive for this ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-peer-dep:@atlaskit/editor-common | AI (dependencies): @atlaskit/editor-common is a core first-party Atlaskit editor package; stable false positive for this ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 20.0.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 19.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 19.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 18.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 17.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 16.0.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 16.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 16.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 15.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 14.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 13.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 12.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 11.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 10.0.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 10.0.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 10.0.0 | 3 / 0 |
v20.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v19.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v19.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v17.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v16.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v16.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v15.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v14.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v12.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.