@atlaskit/editor-plugin-selection
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@atlaskit/tokens | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org @atlaskit scope phantom dep; minor packaging concern, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian's atlassianartifactteam publisher has 64 approved packages; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 125)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.1.8 | 9 / 0 | |
| 6.1.7 | 9 / 0 | |
| 6.1.6 | 9 / 0 | |
| 6.1.5 | 9 / 0 | |
| 6.1.4 | 9 / 0 | |
| 6.1.3 | 9 / 0 | |
| 6.1.2 | 9 / 0 |
v6.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.