@atlaskit/frontend-utilities
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.4.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 3.3.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.2.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.2.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.1.3 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 3.1.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 4 |
v3.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.