@atlaskit/intl-messages-provider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian publishes from Bitbucket CI without Sigstore provenance; consistent across all @atlaskit packages. Publisher has strong track record (194 approved). | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.3.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 3.2.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 3.1.1 | 3 / 5 | |
| 3.1.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 4 |
v3.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.