@atlaskit/link-analytics
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): This is an internal Atlassian monorepo package; short README and no keywords are expected for such packages, not spam indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian publishes this package without Sigstore provenance; consistent across all versions from this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.1.0 | 9 / 10 | |
| 11.0.4 | 9 / 9 | |
| 11.0.3 | 9 / 9 | |
| 11.0.2 | 9 / 8 | |
| 11.0.1 | 9 / 9 | |
| 11.0.0 | 9 / 9 |
v11.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.