@atlaskit/link-provider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian's atlassianartifactteam publishes without Sigstore provenance consistently across their entire @atlaskit/* portfolio; this is a stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.6.0 | 11 / 11 | |
| 4.5.0 | 11 / 11 | |
| 4.4.1 | 11 / 10 | |
| 4.4.0 | 12 / 10 | |
| 4.3.2 | 11 / 9 | |
| 4.3.1 | 11 / 9 | |
| 4.3.0 | 11 / 8 | |
| 4.2.1 | 11 / 8 | |
| 4.2.0 | 11 / 8 | |
| 4.1.0 | 11 / 8 | |
| 4.0.7 | 12 / 9 | |
| 4.0.6 | 12 / 9 | |
| 4.0.5 | 12 / 9 | |
| 4.0.4 | 12 / 9 | |
| 4.0.3 | 12 / 9 | |
| 4.0.2 | 12 / 9 | |
| 4.0.1 | 12 / 9 | |
| 4.0.0 | 12 / 9 |
v4.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.