@atlaskit/media-client-react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian's artifact publishing pipeline does not currently attach Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across their entire @atlaskit/* namespace and is not a risk indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.2.0 | 5 / 10 | |
| 5.1.2 | 5 / 9 | |
| 5.1.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 5.1.0 | 5 / 8 | |
| 5.0.0 | 5 / 8 | |
| 4.2.0 | 5 / 8 |
v5.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.