@atlaskit/progress-bar
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@atlaskit/tokens | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org Atlaskit package; phantom dep pattern is expected in Atlassian monorepo builds where tokens are used transitively or in CSS. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Atlassian package with strong publisher track record; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.2.0 | 4 / 10 | |
| 4.1.11 | 4 / 10 | |
| 4.1.10 | 4 / 10 | |
| 4.1.9 | 4 / 10 | |
| 4.1.8 | 4 / 9 | |
| 4.1.7 | 4 / 9 | |
| 4.1.6 | 5 / 8 | |
| 4.1.5 | 5 / 8 | |
| 4.1.4 | 5 / 8 | |
| 4.1.3 | 5 / 8 | |
| 4.1.2 | 5 / 8 | |
| 4.1.1 | 5 / 8 | |
| 4.1.0 | 5 / 8 | |
| 4.0.14 | 4 / 8 | |
| 4.0.13 | 4 / 8 | |
| 4.0.12 | 4 / 8 | |
| 4.0.11 | 4 / 8 | |
| 4.0.10 | 4 / 8 | |
| 4.0.9 | 4 / 9 | |
| 4.0.8 | 4 / 9 | |
| 4.0.7 | 4 / 9 | |
| 4.0.6 | 4 / 9 | |
| 4.0.5 | 4 / 9 |
v4.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.