@atlaskit/prosemirror-history
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@atlaskit/platform-feature-flags | AI (phantom-deps): First-party Atlaskit package declared for feature-flag configuration via the platform-feature-flags field in package.json; not a direct import by design. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.2.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.2.5 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.2.4 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.2.3 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.2.2 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.2.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 5 |
v0.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.