@atlaskit/ufo
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): atlaskit→atlassianartifactteam is a legitimate Atlassian org-wide CI publishing migration; author/repo unchanged, 15k+ approved pkgs on new account. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Same one-time org publisher migration to atlassianartifactteam; stable across all @atlaskit/* versions going forward. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Atlassian's atlaskit packages consistently publish without Sigstore provenance; this is a stable pattern for this publisher and not a security concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@atlaskit/platform-feature-flags | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org Atlaskit dependency declared but not directly imported; consistent with Atlassian's monorepo patterns. No malicious signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.4.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.2.7 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.2.6 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.2.5 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.2.4 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.2.3 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.2.2 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.0.6 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 9 |
v0.4.0
4 findingsAll previous maintainers (atlaskit) were replaced by new maintainers (atlassianartifactteam). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atlassianartifactteam.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.