@atlaskit/util-service-support
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@atlaskit/platform-feature-flags | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org @atlaskit scoped dependency declared but not directly imported; consistent with monorepo packaging patterns, not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.4.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 6.4.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 6.4.0 | 4 / 3 | |
| 6.3.5 | 4 / 3 | |
| 6.3.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 6.3.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 6.3.2 | 4 / 4 |
v6.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.