@atomify/kit
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/cjs/utilities/store/polyfill/proxy.js | AI (source-diff): File is a standard Proxy polyfill with no actual network calls; rule fired on heuristic pattern match. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/esm/utilities/store/polyfill/proxy.js | AI (source-diff): ESM variant of same Proxy polyfill; same false-positive reasoning applies. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:koa | AI (typosquat): Scoped @atomify package; not a typosquat of koa. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:vite | AI (typosquat): Scoped @atomify package; not a typosquat of vite. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:got | AI (typosquat): Scoped @atomify package; not a typosquat of got. | ai |
v1.4.6
3 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.