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@atproto-labs/rollup-plugin-bundle-manifest

npm Repository Homepage
7
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

devinivyestrattonbaileydholms

Keywords

atprotorollupmanifest

Versions (showing 7 of 7)

Version Deps Published
0.3.3 1 / 1
0.3.2 1 / 1
0.3.1 1 / 1
0.3.0 1 / 2
0.2.0 1 / 2
0.1.2 1 / 2
0.1.1 1 / 2

v0.3.3

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.3.2

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-25, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (devinivy) on 2026-06-25, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.3.1

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-16, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (devinivy) on 2026-06-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.3.0

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-19, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (devinivy) on 2026-05-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.