@atproto/jwk-jose
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Official atproto monorepo migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms supply chain integrity. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Part of the established bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal for this well-known publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.11 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.10 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 1 |
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.