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@atproto/lex-builder

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TypeScript schema builder for AT Lexicons

27
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

dholmspfrazeedevinivyestrattonbaileymatthieu-bluesky

Keywords

atprotolexiconbuildlex

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation from the official bluesky-social/atproto repo; legitimate and expected. ai
npm-metadata suspicious-initial-version AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is standard for @atproto monorepo workspace packages, not a malware indicator. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@atproto/lex-schema AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; expected internal dependency. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@atproto/lex-document AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; expected internal dependency. ai

Versions (showing 27 of 27)

Version Deps Published
0.1.2 5 / 2
0.1.1 5 / 2
0.1.0 5 / 2
0.0.23 5 / 2
0.0.22 5 / 2
0.0.21 5 / 2
0.0.20 5 / 2
0.0.19 5 / 2
0.0.18 5 / 2
0.0.17 5 / 2
0.0.16 5 / 2
0.0.15 5 / 2
0.0.14 5 / 2
0.0.13 5 / 2
0.0.12 5 / 2
0.0.11 5 / 2
0.0.10 5 / 2
0.0.9 5 / 2
0.0.8 5 / 2
0.0.7 5 / 2
0.0.6 5 / 2
0.0.5 5 / 2
0.0.4 5 / 2
0.0.3 5 / 2
0.0.2 5 / 2
0.0.1 5 / 2
0.0.0 5 / 2

v0.1.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.1.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.23

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.20

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.19

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.18

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.17

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-03) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.16

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.15

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-13) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.14

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.13

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-30) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.12

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.11

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.10

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: devinivy → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.0.7

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.6

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.