@atproto/lex-cbor
Lexicon encoding utilities for AT Lexicon data in CBOR format
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance; consistent with bluesky-social/atproto monorepo automation. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): atproto monorepo consistently uses 0.0.0 as initial version; not a malware indicator here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known implicit TypeScript runtime dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.16 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.15 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.14 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.12 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.11 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.10 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.9 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.0 | 3 / 4 |
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.