@atproto/lex-installer
Lexicon document packet manager for AT Lexicons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from devinivy to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing; confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation from the bluesky-social/atproto monorepo. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is standard for atproto monorepo placeholder releases; not indicative of malicious intent. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atproto/lex-builder | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; same publisher and trust chain. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atproto/lex-cbor | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; same publisher and trust chain. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atproto/lex-resolver | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; same publisher and trust chain. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atproto/lex-document | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; same publisher and trust chain. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atproto/lex-schema | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; same publisher and trust chain. | ai |
Versions (showing 29 of 29)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.27 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.26 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.25 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.24 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.23 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.22 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.21 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.20 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.19 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.18 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.17 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.16 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.15 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.14 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.13 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.12 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.11 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.10 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.9 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.8 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.7 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.6 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.5 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 8 / 1 |
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.