@atproto/lex-resolver
Lexicon document resolver utility for AT Lexicons
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): bluesky-social/atproto migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD origin. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is the standard monorepo workspace version for @atproto packages; not a malware signal. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atproto/repo | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; expected dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atproto/crypto | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; expected dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@atproto/lex-client | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the bluesky-social/atproto monorepo; expected dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.24 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.23 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.22 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.21 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.20 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.19 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.18 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.17 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.16 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.15 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.14 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.13 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.12 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.11 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.10 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.9 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.8 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.7 | 9 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 9 / 1 | |
| 0.0.5 | 9 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 9 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.0.0 | 5 / 0 |
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.