@atproto/oauth-types
OAuth typing & validation library
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): bluesky-social/atproto monorepo switched to GitHub Actions publishing; SLSA attestation confirms CI provenance. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects monorepo release cadence, not account takeover; SLSA attestation corroborates legitimacy. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Loopback IPs (127.0.0.1, ::1) in OAuth redirect URI constants are RFC 8252-compliant; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.7.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.6.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.6.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.6.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.5.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.5.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.4.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.2.7 | 2 / 1 |
v0.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.