@atproto/syntax
Validation for atproto identifiers and formats: DID, handle, NSID, AT URI, etc
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation from official bluesky-social/atproto repo; legitimate automation change. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by monorepo CI migration; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate publish pipeline. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): tslib is a standard Microsoft TypeScript runtime helper; no malicious history. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.4.1 | 0 / 2 |
v0.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.