@atproto/syntax
Validation for atproto identifiers and formats: DID, handle, NSID, AT URI, etc
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation from official bluesky-social/atproto repo; legitimate automation change. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by monorepo CI migration; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate publish pipeline. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): tslib is a standard Microsoft TypeScript runtime helper; no malicious history. | ai |
Versions (showing 30 of 30)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.7.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.7.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.6.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.6.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.6.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.6.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.4.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.3.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.3.3 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v0.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.