@aurodesignsystem/auro-button
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/auro-button-CvWxpTkj.js | AI (source-diff): Minified Vite/Rollup bundle with readable lit/web-component code; hashed filenames are standard for this build toolchain. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 12.3.2 | 1 / 8 | |
| 12.3.1 | 1 / 8 | |
| 12.3.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 12.2.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 12.1.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 12.0.0 | 1 / 8 |
v12.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v12.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v12.3.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v12.2.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v12.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v12.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.