@aurodesignsystem/auro-popover
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/auro-popover-k7ROl3Ld.js | AI (source-diff): Standard minified build output for a LitElement/Popper.js web component; content is clearly readable bundled JS, not malicious obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/auro-popover-4nXhLFtL.js | AI (source-diff): Standard minified bundle output for a LitElement/Popper.js web component; content is readable and benign. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lit | AI (phantom-deps): lit is a declared runtime dep bundled into dist; phantom-dep fires because it's tree-shaken into the bundle rather than directly imported by name. | ai |
v6.0.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.