@aws-amplify/amplify-category-custom
amplify-cli custom resources plugin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): CLI command-loader pattern in aws-amplify/amplify-cli; stable and expected across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.33 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.1.32 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.1.31 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.1.30 | 8 / 3 | |
| 3.1.29 | 8 / 3 |
v3.1.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.